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Abstract 
Protected areas are fundamental for conservation, yet are constantly threatened by illegal activities, 
such as cattle encroachment and wildlife poaching, which reduce biodiversity. Law-enforcement is 
an essential component of reducing illegal activities. Although necessary, law-enforcement is costly 
and its effectiveness in the field is rarely monitored. Improving ranger patrol efficiency is likely to 
decrease illegal activity occurrence and benefit biodiversity conservation, without additional 
resource implications. Using ranger-collected data, we develop a method to improve ranger patrol 
allocation, targeting different combinations of conservation priorities, and predict that detections of 
illegal activities can be greatly improved. In a field test in Queen Elizabeth Protected Area, Uganda, 
we increased detections of illegal activities in some cases by over 250% without a change in ranger 
resources. This easily implemented method can be used in any protected area where data on the 
distribution of illegal activities are collected, and improve law-enforcement efficiency in resource-
limited settings.  
 
Introduction 
Illegal activities such as poaching are increasing and a major threat to biodiversity (Hilborn et al. 
2006; Biggs et al. 2013). While policies such as trade restrictions, education and financial penalties 
can help reduce illegal activities (Rosen & Smith 2010; Treves & Bruskotter 2014), protected area 
conservation requires law enforcement policies at all levels, including ranger patrols, intelligence 
gathering and effective criminal justice systems (Challender & MacMillan 2014; Tranquilli et al. 2014; 
Rauset et al. 2015). Law enforcement in the field is fundamental for successful conservation because 
the rangers on the ground represent the primary deterrent that render higher-level legal policies 
effective (Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland 1993; Rowcliffe et al. 2004). Population declines and 
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local extinctions, particularly of large mammals, continue, even within protected areas (Craigie et al. 
2010; Laurance et al. 2012; Di Marco et al. 2014). Although law enforcement is crucial for reducing 
illegal activities (Geldmann et al. 2013) it represents the single largest expenditure in many 
protected areas (Jachmann 2008; Plumptre et al. 2014), suggesting that increasing the efficiency of 
ranger patrol activities should be a priority. 
The efficiency of law enforcement is crucial to its success; when patrols are perceived to be more 
effective there is likely to be less illegal activity (Fischer et al. 2014), while simulations suggest 
increasing detection probability improves effective enforcement (Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams 
1992). However, effective management is often restricted by insufficient financial resources (Di 
Minin & Toivonen 2015). In criminology, spatial crime mapping is now being used to inform and 
improve the efficiency of law enforcement resources (Andresen 2005; Chainey et al. 2008). Despite 
the potential benefits, there have been few studies assessing the efficiency with which rangers are 
deployed in the field, though limited evidence available suggests efficiency may be low and targeting 
of patrols is necessary. For example, Plumptre et al. (2014) report that despite 60% of the Greater 
Virunga Landscape being visited by rangers, they only effectively patrol 22% of the landscape. 
Similarly, theoretical studies suggest that significant financial savings could be achieved through 
better allocation of law enforcement (Dhanjal-Adams et al. 2015). 
Given the paucity of empirical studies of ranger efficiency, it is unsurprising that few methods for 
improving ranger patrols exist. Recently, theoretical work has explored security games (a branch of 
game theory) for allocating resources to protect wildlife and fisheries (Haskell et al. 2014; Yang et al. 
2014; Nguyen et al. 2016), agent based models of poachers and rangers (Keane et al. 2012) and 
spatial models of optimal protected area design and patrolling (Albers 2010) as frameworks for 
thinking about optimising law enforcement. However, these methods, which rely on many 
assumptions, may struggle to cope with the complexity of illegal activities in practice: for example, 
we demonstrated that different illegal activities (e.g. poaching for high-value animal products versus 
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cattle encroachment) occur in different regions of a protected area, suggesting that the optimal 
ranger patrol strategies will differ for each threat (Critchlow et al. 2015).  
Here we develop a method to i) identify the efficiency of ranger patrol strategies in relation to illegal 
activities patterns; ii) determine an improved patrol strategy for any given set of conservation 
priorities using the existing patrol resources and iii) assess the impact of improved strategies on the 
effectiveness of illegal activity detection. We apply this law enforcement allocation method to 
ranger-collected data from the Queen Elizabeth Protected Area (QEPA), south-western Uganda, and 
test it by changing patrol strategies at three ranger posts. This spatial crime mapping approach is 
applicable to any area that records the spatial occurrence of illegal activities, and can inform site-
level patrol strategies.  
Methods 
Improving existing patrol effort: 
The starting point for any method to improve allocation of rangers is at least one geographical map 
of illegal activity occurrence within the area of interest and a map of the current ranger effort. Here 
we used 500m resolution maps of six classes of illegal activity (e.g. encroachment and non-
commercial animal poaching as defined in Critchlow et al. 2015) identified within the QEPA (Figure 
1a). These data were collected over 15 years by Uganda Wildlife Authority rangers and entered into 
software designed to manage ranger-collected law enforcement data: MIST (Management 
Information SysTem) and SMART (Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool; 
http://smartconservationtools.org). These software are now used across many protected areas 
(Hötte et al. 2016). Our maps show the probability of illegal activity occurrence (Figure 1b) estimated 
using Bayesian, spatially explicit generalised additive models that explicitly account for detection 
biases (Critchlow et al. 2015), and these biases must be accounted for when producing accurate 
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occurrence maps (Stokes 2010; Keane et al. 2011). Full details of this method can be found in 
Critchlow et al. (2015) and are provided in the Supplementary Material. 
With maps of occurrence and patrol effort, an improved patrol strategy for maximizing the detection 
of any given class of illegal activity is the strategy that places maximum effort in areas with 
maximum probabilities of occurrence of that class of activity (Ratcliffe 2004; Kennedy et al. 2010). (If 
detection probabilities vary spatially as a function of, e.g. visibility, improving patrols might be a 
balance between actual occurrence probability and detectability but in our mapping process we 
assume that the probability of detecting an illegal activity on any one visit to a cell is constant across 
space, with only effort (the number of visits to a cell) varying spatially). This can be implemented by 
arranging existing ranger patrol effort according to the ranked probabilities of each activity occurring 
per cell, such that the highest probability cells receive the greatest effort (Figure 1c). We use ranks 
to allocate effort, not direct proportions (which would be optimal) because we sought to maintain 
the actual realised distribution of ranger effort in order to maintain realism, but without this 
constraint improvements could be greater. Technical details and R code to implement all analyses 
are provided as Supplementary Material. 
To identify the patrol strategy that simultaneously improves the detection of multiple classes of 
activity (e.g. maximise efficiency of detecting all six illegal activities simultaneously, or focus mainly 
on commercial animal poaching, but also include encroachment and other illegal activities as lower 
priorities) is more complex and requires managers to decide a priori on relative weightings for each 
class of activity. These weightings determine not the number of detections desired for each activity, 
but the proportion of overall resource that should be allocated to each problem activity, a decision 
that needs to be carefully considered by managers. Here, we illustrate three different strategies: one 
representing an even weighting of all six, a second focussing only on commercial and subsistence 
animal poaching (50% each), and one representing different proportional weightings (Proportional 
mix) to the two animal poaching categories and encroachment (40%, 40%, 20% respectively). If it 
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were decided that ranger resources should be evenly allocated between each illegal activity type 
irrespective of relative abundance of each activity, ranger effort should target all illegal activities 
simultaneously (‘Evenly mixed strategy’). To calculate this we normalised the occurrence probability 
between classes such that the maximum was one and minimum zero, set cell values to the maximum 
normalised probability of any of the six illegal activities and used the rank of these probabilities to 
order existing ranger effort as before. For the three different strategies, we first weighted the 
normalised probability values for each illegal activity of interest according to the conservation 
priorities assigned to them and then selected the maximum as before. It is important to normalise 
probabilities before combining them, because different activities occur at different rates which, if 
ignored, will result in solutions that effectively sample only the commonest illegal activities, when 
rarer activities may be more important (Table S2 shows an alternative allocation targeting all illegal 
activities using raw probabilities, resulting in decreased detection of the majority of illegal activities, 
but an overall increase of total detections by 3.9%).  
Predicting efficiency changes: 
Because our occurrence maps are based on models which include an estimate of detectability 
(Critchlow et al. 2015)), we could estimate the expected number of detections of each activity type 
for any given spatial arrangement of ranger effort. To estimate number of detections (and 
associated uncertainty) for any given strategy, the improved patrol strategy is substituted in place of 
existing ranger effort (Figure 1d). For details on predicting changes in patrol efficiency, see 
Supplementary Methods. 
Differences between current and improved strategies: 
To identify areas where current patrol effort is either too high or too low relative to improved 
strategies we subtracted the two values. As a further step we recognised that there may be cells for 
which recommended patrol effort should always increase or decrease irrespective of conservation 
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priorities. Cells where increased effort is recommended were identified where current patrol 
strategy is below the minimum recommended effort when prioritising any of the five terrestrial 
classes of illegal activity (i.e. excluding fishing), cells where decreased effort is recommended 
indicate where current effort is always greater than the maximum recommended effort. 
Field testing of improved patrol strategy: 
Both control and test sites (Figure 2) were selected based on the quantity of ranger-collected data 
(MIST/SMART) from the previous two years and where there were a high number of patrols in the 
surrounding 5-8km of the patrol post. Control sites represented all remaining standard posts in the 
north of the QEPA that showed similar threats and had recorded at least 50km of patrols within 5km 
of the site prior to and during the testing period. The three ranger posts where patrol strategies 
would be manipulated were chosen based on ease of access, allowing regular data downloading, and 
because these are in known areas of high illegal activity occurrence (i.e. high occurrence of cattle 
encroachment, snares and firewood collection). 
All data were collected from May to September 2015. Comparison data (MIST/SMART) was from 
January 2014 to April 2015 for the same patrol areas (i.e. 5km around each ranger patrol post) to 
ensure sufficient effort data was available for comparison of CPUE from both periods. 
Across the test patrol posts, given the high probability of encroachment, plant harvesting and non-
commercial animal poaching, the improved patrol strategy aimed to simultaneously target these 
three priorities. The improved patrol strategy was implemented using weightings of 40% 
encroachment, 40% non-commercial animal and 20% non-commercial plant (Figure S2).  
To generate improved patrol strategies, all areas within 5km of the patrol posts within the 
jurisdiction of the post were assigned to a 500m grid (Figure 2b). A 5km area was because the 
majority of patrols already occur within 5km of patrol posts (Plumptre et al. 2014). For each patrol 
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post, coordinates within the grid cells were selected with a probability proportional to the improved 
patrol strategy, such that more coordinates fell in areas requiring high effort than elsewhere.  
During the testing period rangers were given up to three coordinates to reach during their regular 
foot patrols each day. Fifteen coordinates were issued each month, reflecting the frequency of 
patrol activity. Rangers were asked to patrol as normal, including searching water holes, visiting 
areas of known previous illegal activity and walking animal tracks, while aiming towards the given 
coordinates. Rangers were asked not to travel directly from their ranger post to the coordinates. 
Once close to the coordinates (within 250m) rangers were encouraged to search more actively for 
evidence of illegal activities within a 500m radius of the location. Data was collected using 
CyberTracker and SMART software on CAT B15 Q mobile phones. 
Assessing patrol effectiveness: 
To assess patrol effectiveness we calculated catch per unit effort (CPUE) for each ranger post by 
dividing the number of illegal activities detected per kilometre walked. Because testing coordinates 
were restricted to within 5 km of a ranger post,  CPUE was also restricted to data collected only 
within 5 km of each ranger post. CPUE was then calculated for the preceding 16 months from the 
same patrol areas, i.e. 5km around each ranger patrol post. Monthly variation in illegal activity 
occurrence is low (see Supplementary Material). 
To test the effect of patrol strategy manipulation, we used Generalized Linear Models with a 
Gaussian error structure; the CPUE ratio was the response, with patrol post and the interaction 
between time (pre/post-testing) and patrol post type (control/test) as explanatory variables. All 
analyses were conducted in R 3.2.2 (www.r-project.com). 
 
Results 
Improved patrol strategies: 
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Improving patrol allocation for each activity is expected to increase the number of cells where illegal 
activities are detected (Table 1). The current patrol strategy visits between 28.9% and 62.4% of the 
cells with illegal activities that would be identified using strategies improved for each activity in turn. 
Improving effort allocation for any activity resulted in an increase in detections of most other 
categories of activity with respect to the current patrol strategy.  
The evenly mixed strategy suggests effort should be directed to the periphery of the QEPA and near 
water channels (Figure 3a). It would result in around a 50% increase in detections in most illegal 
activities with respect to current detections, and should detect a minimum of 80% of the improved 
strategy for each class in turn (Table 1). Arranging patrols to focus different proportions of effort on 
illegal activities results in slightly different improved strategies, (Figure 3b) and detecting a minimum 
of 90% of the improved strategy for each class in turn (Table 1).  
Irrespective of conservation priorities, areas where current patrol effort is too high, relative to the 
current patrol effort, are mostly in the south and central regions of the QEPA, whilst areas where 
current effort is too low are dominated by large areas in the north and south-east of the QEPA 
(Figure 3d). 
Comparison of CPUE from test and control ranger posts: 
Two of the test sites (Kahendero and Kabirizi) had a vastly greater CPUE in the 5 month testing 
period than CPUE in the preceding 16 months while at the third test site (Nymugasani) CPUE values 
were more similar from the two periods (Figure 4; Table S3). More illegal activities were recorded 
from the test posts during the testing period than prior to the testing period (Table S3). Across the 
three test ranger posts, altering patrol strategies had a significant effect on CPUE (F1,9 = 6.61, P = 
0.033). 
 
Discussion 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
  
  
We described a simple method using maps of illegal activity occurrence to improve the effectiveness 
of ranger patrols. We found that current patrol strategies in the QEPA may be sub-optimal, 
predicting increases of around 50% in cells where illegal activities are detected if allocation of 
existing patrols improved. In a field trial, we showed that detections of illegal activities can be 
substantially increased by directing ranger effort using our allocation strategy. These results are 
directly comparable to successful implementation of spatial crime mapping systems in urban 
environments (Chainey et al. 2008; Delle Fave et al. 2014) and support the suggestions of Linkie et al. 
(2010) and Dhanjal-Adams et al. (2015) that the efficiency of law enforcement effort can easily be 
improved. Whilst the overall results are therefore unsurprising, the scale of the potential benefits is 
notable. 
Implementation of our allocation method and field test makes some assumptions and could be 
improved. For example, rearranging effort in proportion to occurrence ignores the fact that rangers 
operate out of fixed bases and follow linear patrol routes. Similarly, due to constraints on the degree 
to which rangers could be directed by us, control and treatment posts were not randomly allocated. 
Consequently we are not certain that increases in CPUE at test sites were due to improved allocation 
per se, or simply from increased vigilance of rangers when applying new methods (the Hawthorne 
effect - McCambridge et al. 2014).  
At the Nymugasani patrol post there was little change in CPUE. This post differs from the other two 
test sites because encroachment for cattle grazing is the dominant illegal activity here 
(Supplementary material; Critchlow et al. 2015) and allocating effort towards animal poaching may 
have simultaneously reduced detections of encroachment. This suggests that practical 
improvements may be possible through first improving effort allocation across the area as a whole, 
then enhanced within sectors based on local priorities.  
Further testing of altered patrol allocation in more sites and for longer periods is needed to address 
the wider impact of these patrol strategies, especially because poacher behaviour is likely to alter in 
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relation to the changes in patrols (Keane et al. 2008). Although illegal activity patterns in QEPA are 
relatively constant over time (Critchlow et al. 2015), short-term spatio-temporal changes do occur 
and continuously updating recommended patrol effort allocation using the most recent data (e.g. 
SMART) is important. To enable this, monitoring of low probability areas must be built into patrol 
responsibilities to provide early detection of spatio-temporal changes, such as planning daily routes 
to ensure a varied patrol distribution while still targeting areas with high occurrence probability.  
Game theoretic models (Haskell et al. 2014) and community interviews (Fischer et al. 2014; Harrison 
et al. 2015) suggest deterrence has a key role in determining law-enforcement efficiency. Empirical 
data on deterrence is rare, although a recent study suggests deterrence effects resulted in lower 
poaching levels (Linkie et al. 2015). Areas with currently low probabilities of occurrence may reflect 
the deterrent effect of relatively high patrol coverage, yet our effort allocation method suggests 
these areas are over patrolled. It is unclear whether ranger effort should be directed primarily 
towards the areas where illegal activities currently occur, or towards preventing activities from 
occurring in core zones. Resource allocation methods used in conservation planning (e.g. Marxan) 
could also be used to achieve an optimum deployment of rangers, aiding the design of effective 
strategies (Plumptre et al. 2014). Furthermore, optimal allocation of patrols can only be determined 
when the relative importance given to each illegal activity is explicit and is an area that needs 
research. 
Despite these uncertainties, our methods identify areas to which ranger patrols can be directed with 
positive impacts in the field. By analogy with work on spatial crime mapping, we consider that our 
method offers potential for improving law enforcement within protected areas without increasing 
the resources required for patrols.  
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Table 1. Expected mean number of cells with detections of illegal activities within the Queen 
Elizabeth Protected Area, Uganda, assuming the improved patrol strategies for each illegal activity 
type. Patrol strategies are defined by matching patrol effort according to cells with high 
probability of illegal activity. Values in bold represent the number of expected cells recorded with 
each illegal activity that the improved strategy would report. Values in brackets represent the 
percent of the improved strategy achieved for each alternative strategy.  
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Example of process to determine improved effort allocation for commercial animal 
poaching in the Queen Elizabeth Protected Area, Uganda (a). (b) Current estimated probability of 
occurrence; (c) Improved ranger patrol strategy; (d) Expected number of detections of animal 
poaching with current effort and using an improved strategy.  
 
Figure 2. Selected ranger posts in the Queen Elizabeth Protected Area. a) Locations of test and 
control posts; b) area around each test patrol posts (boxed areas - 500m grid cells) used to 
compare data collected pre and during testing period. 
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Figure 3. Patrol strategy recommendations in Queen Elizabeth Protected Area; (a-c) improved 
patrol strategy scenarios to increase efficiency of detecting illegal activities; (d) recommended 
changes in patrol effort with respect to current patrol strategy irrespective of conservation 
priorities within the QEPA. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of catch per unit effort (CPUE) between the three ranger patrol posts where 
patrols were manipulated (test sites) and the seven patrol posts where no changes to patrol 
strategies were made (control sites). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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